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This Article looks at Alaska’s method of adjudicating choice of
law issues that arise in tort claims and contract disputes, and high-
lights some of the pitfalls associated with application of Alaska’s
choice of law methodology, the Second Restatement.  Specifically,
the Article examines tort and contract case hypotheticals that may
be resolved under more than one state’s laws, where those laws
conflict, and attempts to determine appropriate choice of law.
Both the First Restatement and the Second Restatement address
these issues, and the Article traces Alaska’s shift from the territo-
rial rules of the First Restatement to the more ambiguous “most
significant relationship test” of the Second Restatement.  Because
of its ambiguity, the Second Restatement is difficult to apply, al-
lowing courts to interpret its provisions differently.  This Article
sets out both Restatements, then determines the proper method for
interpreting and using the Second Restatement.  The Article ana-
lyzes Alaska courts’ conflict of laws decisions, along with two fed-
eral cases interpreting Alaska law, in order to determine whether
the appropriate methodology has been followed.  The Article con-
cludes that the Second Restatement has not been followed cor-
rectly or consistently in Alaska, and that the Alaska courts need to
adopt a more specific method of analysis to provide courts and
practitioners both with structural guidance as to how the provi-
sions of the Second Restatement are to be applied.
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Of course, the mere fact that a state supreme court cites the Sec-
ond Restatement reveals little about how it will in fact decide
conflicts problems.  Opting for that eclectic authority may mean
no more than that the judges cannot agree, or have not thought
about, what exactly should replace the traditional choice of law
rules.1
I.  INTRODUCTION
In a 1985 decision, the Supreme Court of Alaska adopted the
methodology advocated by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws (“Second Restatement”) for adjudicating choice of law is-
sues in tort—the “most significant relationship” test.2  Ten years
later, the supreme court followed its own lead and also espoused
the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship test for
making choice of law determinations in contract.3  These cases
revolutionized Alaska’s method of adjudicating choice of law is-
sues by abandoning the state’s ties to the rigid territorial rules of
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws (“First Restatement”).  How-
ever, these cases on their own have failed to provide Alaska with a
coherent approach for adjudicating choice of law issues in the fu-
ture.
Disturbingly, the most noteworthy characteristic of the Sec-
ond Restatement is its ambiguity, a characteristic that has left a
multitude of courts confused over how its provisions are to be in-
terpreted.  As a result, the decision to adopt the Second Restate-
ment as a methodology for resolving choice of law issues is only
the first step for Alaskan courts.  The ambiguity of the Second Re-
statement itself, combined with erratic application of its method-
ology by both the Alaska Supreme Court and the United States
District Court for the Ninth Circuit sitting in Alaska, has muddied
already unclear waters for Alaska courts and practitioners.  As a
necessary second step, Alaska courts now must sift through the
complex and ambiguous provisions of the Second Restatement  in
order to establish a more coherent and analytically consistent
method of choice of law.  The purpose of this Article, therefore, is
to familiarize Alaska courts and practitioners with some of the
controversies and pitfalls surrounding the application of Alaska’s
1. FRIEDRICH K. JUENGER, CHOICE OF LAW AND MULTISTATE JUSTICE 117
(1993).
2. See M.O. Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Canada, Ltd., 705 P.2d
446, 453 (Alaska 1985).
3. See Palmer G. Lewis Co., Inc. v. Arco Chem. Co., 904 P.2d 1221, 1227 &
n.14 (Alaska 1995).  Because Alaska’s espousal of the Second Restatement has
been most evident in its courts’ contract and tort opinions, this Article is confined
to a discussion of choice of law issues in contract and tort.
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adopted choice of law methodology—the Second Restatement’s
“most significant relationship” test.
II.  CHOICE OF LAW DETERMINATIONS
Prior to the adoption of the Second Restatement, choice of
law issues largely were governed by the territorial “rules”4 of the
First Restatement.5  These rules, like the Second Restatement,
taxonomized choice of law issues into rigid categories based upon
the specific type of claim presented.  For each “category” of issue,
the American Law Institute (“ALI”), which authored the First Re-
statement, determined that there would be one specific contact
that would be jurisdiction selecting, regardless of the number and
nature of contacts that the issue or parties may have possessed
with other jurisdictions.6
While the First Restatement’s rules offered ease of admini-
stration, their “plug-and-chug” method of application proved to be
analytically constraining.  According to some, it left courts with lit-
tle ability to administer justice when the nature of the events
overwhelmingly pointed to the application of the law of a jurisdic-
tion different from where the First Restatement’s predetermined
controlling event took place.  For example, note 2 of Section 377
provided that when one person caused another to voluntarily take
a deleterious substance, the place of the wrong was where the sub-
stance took effect.7  By way of illustration, the Restatement then
provided the following hypothetical:
A, in state X, mails to B, in state Y, a package containing poi-
soned candy.  B eats the candy in state Y and gets on a train to
go to state W.  After the train has passed into state Z, he be-
comes ill as a result of the poison and eventually dies from the
poison in state W.  The place of the wrong is state Z.8
In other words, the ALI arguably determined that although (1)
neither party resided in state Z, (2) the poison was neither sent to
4. These rules are often referred to as “lex loci,” which is Latin for the “law
of the place.”  Examples include lex loci delicti (the law of the place of the wrong)
or lex loci contractus (the law of the place of contracting).
5. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
6. See, e.g., id. §§ 332 (contract), 378 (tort).  Section 332 declared that the
validity of a contract was to be determined by the law of the place where the con-
tract was made.  Section 378 directed courts to apply the law of the place of the
wrong when faced with choice of law issues in tort, regardless of the number and
nature of the contacts that the parties may have possessed with other jurisdic-
tions.  The place of the wrong usually is considered to be the place of injury.  See
id. § 377 nn.1-5 and illus. 1-7 (1934).
7. See id. § 377 n.2.
8. Id. § 377 illus. 2.
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nor ingested in state Z, (3) neither A nor B ever intended on stop-
ping in state Z, and (4) the fact that B became sick in state Z was
completely fortuitous, the decision of the railroad to travel through
state Z on the way to state W was the most important factor in the
case.  The route of the railway therefore trumped the law of the
place where B presumably resided, where A knowingly and delib-
erately sent the poison (which presumably was also the place
where A planned on the harm occurring), and where the poison
was actually ingested.  Equally as illogical is the fact that, under
this rule, B’s ability to collect from A could change each and every
time B crossed a state line.9
Because of these types of intellectual constraints, and their po-
tential to lead to unpredictable results, the First Restatement was
criticized severely for its attempt to handle complex aspects of
choice of law with a strict set of rules derived from over-simplified
principles of territoriality.10  In response, courts revolted.  Many
courts either rejected the First Restatement outright as the juris-
diction’s governing choice of law authority, or utilized “escape de-
vices.”  “Escape devices” allowed courts to avoid the seemingly
applicable rules of the First Restatement by characterizing the na-
ture of a claim to avoid the undesirable sections, or by making cer-
tain procedural or policy determinations that allowed courts to
dismiss a claim or apply the law of the forum of some other non-
offending jurisdiction instead of applying the law of the jurisdiction
called for by the First Restatement.11
9. Of course, all of this disregards reality in that, since B is dead, it will be
very difficult to pinpoint in which state he first grew ill before dying and, even had
B lived, there would be no valid means of determining whether B was lying about
in what state he grew ill in order to have the law of the most plaintiff-favorable
state applied to his claim.
10. See, e.g., David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47
HARV. L. REV. 173 (1933); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the
Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
11. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543, 547-49 (Or. 1964) (en banc)
(applying Oregon law to protect an Oregon defendant by voiding a contract, to
which California law otherwise was applicable as the place of contracting, per-
formance, and plaintiff’s residence, on the ground that California’s law ran contra
to Oregon’s public policy of making spendthrifts’ contracts voidable); Haumschild
v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d. 814, 816-19 (Wis. 1959) (suggesting that the
application of the law called for by “at least” six prior decisions and Sections 378
and 384(2) of the First Restatement was outdated and contrary to Wisconsin pub-
lic policy, and characterizing interspousal immunity as an issue of “family law”
rather than tort, in holding that the law governing interspousal immunity is not
the law of the place of the alleged wrong but the law of the place where the par-
ties are domiciled); Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 946-49 (Cal. 1953) (skirting
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By 1952, the American legal profession had come to realize
that the First Restatement was beyond salvage.12  Recognizing that
the theoretical basis underlying the First Restatement’s territorial
rules had become untenable, the ALI commenced work on a new
and more flexible version of the Restatement that took into con-
sideration the quality of the contacts that contending jurisdictions
possessed with the parties and each disputed issue.13
III.  ALASKA’S PATH TO THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
A. Tort
Prior to 1968, Alaska courts had suggested that tort liability
would be governed by the laws of the place of the wrong in a man-
ner consistent with the territorial rules approach of the First Re-
statement.14  However, in 1968, in Armstrong v. Armstrong,15  the
Alaska Supreme Court was faced with a factual situation in which
the strict application of the First Restatement’s rules would have
led to an unacceptable result.  It was at this stage that the court
took account of previous criticism directed at the First Restate-
ment and redefined its approach towards making choice of law de-
terminations.16
                                                                                                                                
Section 390 of the First Restatement and case law that directed courts to apply
the law of the place of the wrong in determining whether a cause of action sur-
vives the death of a negligent tortfeasor, and instead using two escape devices to
apply the law of the forum: (1) characterizing the issue as “procedural” and (2)
labeling the issue as one involving estate law rather than tort).  It is worth noting
that courts in different jurisdictions have disagreed on how properly to label an
issue even when interpreting the same statute.  Compare Noe v. United States Fi-
delity & Guar. Co., 406 S.W.2d 666, 671 (Mo. 1966) (labeling a section of the
Louisiana statute that allowed injured parties to bring a direct action against the
insurer as procedural), with Morton v. Maryland Cas. Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 524, 527
(N.Y. App. Div. 1955) (labeling the identical section of the Louisiana statute as
substantive).  See also Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1043 n.12 (1987) (describing different types of “escape de-
vices” used by the courts).
12. See generally, JUENGER, supra note 1, at 96 (noting that “most scholars
considered [the] First Restatement obsolete”).
13. See Smith, supra note 11, at 1045.
14. See Marine Constr. v. Vessel TIM, 434 P. 2d 683, 686 (Alaska 1967) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 279 (1934) in declaring that “the creation
of tort liability is governed by the law of the place of the injury”); Lillegraven v.
Tengs, 375 P.2d 139, 140 (Alaska 1962) (same).
15. 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968).
16. See id. at 701-04.
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In Armstrong, the supreme court was called upon to resolve
an interspousal dispute arising from an automobile accident that
occurred while husband and wife, both long-time Alaska domi-
ciliaries, were traveling from Washington through the Yukon Ter-
ritory of Canada.17  Following the accident, the husband instituted
a personal injury claim against the estate of his late wife, who was
driving the car at the time of the fatal crash.18  While Alaskan law
recognized interspousal actions based upon negligently inflicted
harms, the law of the Yukon Territory provided defendant spouses
with immunity.19
In Armstrong, the strict application of the First Restatement’s
lex loci delicti rule would have mandated that the laws of the
Yukon Territory, as the place of the wrong, be applied to bar the
husband’s claim.  Under this approach, rather than being governed
by the laws of the more involved jurisdiction, the state in which the
couple was domiciled, the liabilities of married persons towards
one another could change every time the couple crossed a state or
country line.  Recognizing the variable results this approach would
generate, the supreme court distinguished Armstrong from its prior
cases with lex loci delicti and rejected the notion that earlier cases
had established lex loci delicti as a controlling choice of law prece-
dent.20  Overturning the trial court’s application of the lex loci de-
licti rule,21 the supreme court cited the “most significant relation”
approach advocated by the Second Restatement (then existing as a
tentative draft) in holding that the law of the place where married
17. See id. at 703.
18. See id. at 699.  The family’s insurance carrier was joined as a defendant.
19. See id. at 699-700.
20. See id. at 700-01 (asserting that “[Marine Construction] did not involve a
tort action but rather raised questions concerning the applicable statute of limita-
tions . . . .  Although we did allude generally to the place-of-wrong conflicts rule
in our decision in Lillegraven, the doctrine of lex loci delicti was not employed as a
basis for the actual decision reached there”).
21. In a battery of criticism, the supreme court declared:
That old rule [lex loci delicti] is today almost completely discredited as
an unvarying guide to choice of law decision in all tort cases . . . .  No
conflict of laws authority in America today agrees that the old rule
should be retained . . . .  No American court which has felt free to re-
examine the matter thoroughly in the last decade has chosen to retain
the old rule . . . .  It is true that some courts, even in recent decisions,
have retained it . . . [b]ut their failure to reject it has resulted from an
unwillingness to abandon established precedent before they were sure
that a better rule was available, not to any belief that the old rule was a
good one.
Id. at 702 n.17 (citations omitted).
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parties are domiciled is the applicable law when adjudicating inter-
spousal liabilities and immunities.22
Although the court applied the law of the place where the
married couple was domiciled and directed acerbic criticism at the
lex loci delicti approach, it did not formally adopt the methodology
of the Second Restatement for future choice of law determina-
tions.23  Instead, the court limited its holding by characterizing the
application of lex loci delicti to interspousal immunity cases as a
violation of Alaskan public policy under the specific circumstances
of the case.24  Seventeen years later the supreme court clarified its
position.
In Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Company of Canada, Ltd.,25
the court was asked to determine the appropriate measure of dam-
ages in a wrongful death case brought by a pilot’s widow against
the owner and manufacturer of an aircraft.26  While the crash oc-
curred in Alaska, the decedent pilot’s personal representative and
family resided in Florida.27
Instead of applying the First Restatement’s lex loci delicti ap-
proach, the supreme court formally adopted the cornerstone of the
Second Restatement’s tort analysis, the “most significant relation-
ship” test.  The court declared that according to Sections 175 and
178, “[t]he measure of damages used in an action for wrongful
death should be the law of the state with the most significant rela-
tionship to the occurrence and the parties.”28  Applying the factors
listed in Section 145 of the Second Restatement, the court held
that Alaska had the most significant relationship with the issues
raised in this wrongful death action since the crash occurred there
on an intrastate flight, the pilot had lived in Alaska for the major-
ity of three years preceding the crash, the owner of the plane was a
22. See id. at 702 (citing Section 390(g) of the Second Restatement as a tenta-
tive draft, since revised and redrafted as Second Restatement Section 169); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 and cmt. b (1971).
23. See Armstrong, 441 P.2d at 704.
24. See id. at 703.  The court declared:
[W]e believe that adherence to the mechanical lex loci delicti choice-of-
law rule would frustrate the policy of the State of Alaska in regard to in-
terspousal causes of action and liabilities in tort, and would give unwar-
ranted precedence to the laws of a jurisdiction with which the parties’
contacts were merely fortuitous, transitory, and insubstantial.
  Id.
25. 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).
26. See id. at 449.
27. See id. at 453.
28. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 175, 178
(1971)).
MESCHEWSKI.CONVERT.2 05/07/99  11:37 AM
8 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
domiciliary of Alaska doing business there, and the pilot’s em-
ployment relationship was centered in Alaska.29  Thus, while the
court ultimately reached the same conclusion that it would have
under the lex loci methodology, it made a deliberate effort to reach
this conclusion by distancing itself from the lex loci delicti ap-
proach and by formally adopting the “most significant relation-
ship” approach of the Second Restatement.
B. Contract
While DeHavilland clearly marked Alaska’s espousal of the
Second Restatement’s “most significant relationship” test for ac-
tions brought in tort,30 it was not until 1995 that Alaska made a
similar determination in contract.31  In Palmer G. Lewis Co. v.
Arco Chemical Co.,32 the court was asked to determine the en-
forceability of an indemnity provision contained in a contract be-
tween a manufacturer and one of its raw material suppliers.33  The
manufacturer claimed that the law of Washington should be ap-
plied, as the site of the negotiating, contracting, and performance
of the sales contract.34  The supplier, however, argued that because
the ultimate issue involved whether the manufacturer was entitled
to implied indemnity under Alaska’s common law, the law of
29. See id.
30. See id; see also Smith, supra note 11, at 1051.
31. Although it would seem logically consistent to apply the same choice of
law methodology in contract as in tort, Alaska’s adoption of the Second Restate-
ment in contract was not a foregone conclusion.  Several states have used sepa-
rate methodologies for choice of law determinations in contract and tort.  See,
e.g., William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of
Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of its Successor: Contemporary Practice in
the Traditional Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196, 1206-09 (1997) (noting that four
states, Florida, Connecticut, Tennessee and Oklahoma, continue to apply the
First Restatement in contract, but not in tort).
The Alaska Supreme Court provided early hints of how it might proceed in
making choice of law determinations in contract prior to 1995.  For example, in
Wear v. Farmers and Merchants Bank of Las Cruces, 605 P.2d 27 (Alaska 1980),
the court cited approvingly the Second Restatement’s methodology for making
choice of law determinations in contract, without going so far as to base its hold-
ing upon it.  See id. at 31.  The court cited the Second Restatement as one of many
sources supporting the principle that “the law of the state which has the most sig-
nificant relation with the contract, the assignment and the parties should govern,”
but ultimately based its holding upon what it referred to as “general law.”  Id.
32. 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995).
33. See id. at 1223.
34. See id. at 1227.
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Alaska should be applied.35  In the end, the court left no doubt
about how it would proceed as to choice of law issues arising in
contract: “When choice of law issues arise, we commonly refer to
the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts for guidance.”36  Applying
the principles of the Second Restatement, the court then deter-
mined that the law of Washington was controlling.37
IV. CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS UNDER THE SECOND
RESTATEMENT
A. Background
Now that Alaska has adopted the Second Restatement’s
“most significant relationship” test for resolving choice of law is-
sues arising in tort and contract, Alaska courts must prepare them-
selves to navigate the provisions of this complex and ambiguous
treatise.  This undertaking is even more difficult than it sounds, be-
cause there is no generally accepted manner as to how the sections
of the Second Restatement should be interpreted.  As opposed to
the nature of the field in 1934, when the territorial approach of the
First Restatement enjoyed wide-ranging support, there was no sin-
gle methodology that stood in line to succeed the territorial rules
of the First Restatement.  Instead, the collapse of the First Re-
statement had resulted in a balkanization of the choice of law field
into half a dozen or so different methodologies, each claiming judi-
cial support.38  From the application of the laws of the jurisdiction
with the “most significant relationship,” to the dispute surrounding
the “governmental interest analysis” method,39 courts across the
35. See id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See JUENGER, supra note 1, at 96.
39. A significant debate in the choice of law field concerns whether the gov-
ernmental interest analysis method is, in fact, adopted by Section 6 of the Second
Restatement.  Briefly stated, this method, credited to Professor Brainerd Currie
of Duke University School of Law, is based on the theory that only states that
have an “interest” in the issue should have their law applied.  See generally Brain-
erd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE
L.J. 171 (1959).  Apart from certain conduct-regulating state government con-
cerns arising in tort, the governmental interest analysis approach treats a state as
“interested” only if one of its domiciliaries will benefit by the application of its
law, such that a state that is only territorially involved in a dispute is not deemed
“interested” (an approach sometimes referred to as “lawmaker chauvinism”).  See
William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecticism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mish-
mash, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 659 (1983).  In cases where more than one state
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country selected, á la carte, from a menu of theories advocated by
choice of law scholars in an attempt to develop a coherent and just
choice of law methodology for their respective jurisdictions.40  As a
result, rather than “restating” what was occurring anywhere in the
country (as its title would suggest), the drafters of the Second Re-
statement pieced the provisions of the treatise together through a
series of compromises in an attempt to “restate” a beginning.41
Realizing that the Second Restatement failed to represent the
“communis opinio”42 of either the courts or academia, many of the
most distinguished choice of law scholars disagreed with the very
thought of publishing a Second Restatement.43  In fact, the corner-
stone of the Second Restatement’s “most significant relationship”
test, Section 6, passed by the slim margin of thirteen to twelve.44
Nonetheless, members of the ALI pressed on and, despite a bar-
                                                                                                                                
possesses an “interest,” the court will simply defer to the law of the forum.  See
Currie, supra, at 178.
Such an approach, however, seems inconsistent with the Second Restate-
ment’s inclusion of territorial sections that create presumptions in favor of the law
of a particular jurisdiction without regard for the parties’ domiciles.  See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-47, 148(1), 149, 151-52,
154-55, 189-91, 193-97 (1971).  The difference between the two methodologies is
highlighted in cases where no one state is clearly the most interested or has the
most significant relationship.  In such cases, Currie’s governmental interest analy-
sis approach employs a forum-law break device, while the Second Restatement
seems to default to the law as specified by the applicable presumptive section.
See id.; Currie, supra, at 178.
As a result, this Article will follow the lead of Bates v. Superior Court and
Beals v. Sicpa Securink Corp., and will assume that the governmental interest
analysis method has not been adopted into the methodology of the Second Re-
statement.  See Bates v. Superior Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1370 (Ariz. 1988) (en
banc) (determining California’s governmental interests analysis approach to be so
materially different from the Second Restatement that Arizona courts should not
rely on California cases for precedent even where California cases are the only
precedent relating to the disputed issue); Beals v. Scipa Securink Corp., No.
CIV.A. 92-1512, 92-2588, and 93-0190, 1994 WL 236018 at *2 (D.D.C. May 17,
1994) (recognizing the governmental interest analysis and Second Restatement
approaches as distinct, but nevertheless applying a constructive blending of the
two approaches).
40. See JUENGER, supra note 1, at 106-07.
41. See Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Second Conflicts Restatement: Last Appeal
for its Withdrawal, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1230, 1244 (1965).
42. Id. at 1232.
43. See, e.g., id. at 1230 (advocating the Second Restatement’s withdrawal);
Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754,
755 (1963) (professing doubts and reservations in regard to the “threatened”
adoption of the Second Restatement).
44. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 41, at 1237.
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rage of criticism and a number of appeals for its withdrawal,45 the
Second Restatement officially was adopted in 1969.
B. The Three-Tier Structure
Divided into three separate “tiers,” the sections of the Second
Restatement truly reflect the fact that their drafting was a product
of compromise.  In some cases, these sections appear to reincar-
nate the territorial approach of the First Restatement, while in
others, rejection of the territorial approach is clear.  Because the
Second Restatement provides only minimal guidance as to how the
three tiers are meant to interact with one another, the task of de-
termining how best to integrate the separate tiers has been left to
the courts.  Instead of achieving integration, however, most judicial
opinions (Alaska’s included) portray the analytical flailing of
courts among all three of the Second Restatement’s tiers.
1.   The First Tier: The Territorial Presumption Sections.  In
one respect, the tenor of the Second Restatement resembles the
familiar territorial rules approach embodied in the First
Restatement.  This is because the first tier of the Second
Restatement (Sections 146 through 149, 151, 152, 154, and 155 for
tort,46 and Sections 189 through 197 for contract) contains a series
of presumptions directed toward certain specific factual situations,
based largely on the territorial rules of the First Restatement.47
For example, Section 146 declares that for personal injury issues, a
presumption arises in favor of the law of the state where the injury
occurred.48  Similarly, when determining the validity of a life
insurance contract, Section 192 establishes a presumption in favor
of the law of the place where the insured party was domiciled at
the time the policy was issued.49
The most significant aspects of the Second Restatement are
not its retention of territorial rules, but rather its movement away
45. See Currie, supra note 43, at 755; Reppy, supra note 39, at 655 n.43
(recounting further criticism directed at the Second Restatement).
46. Sections 150 and 153, containing more advisory language, are instead
drafted in a similar manner as the “specific-issue sections.”  However, instead of
referring back to a general area of law section, Sections 150 and 153 refer directly
to Section 6.  See infra notes 124, 105-29 and accompanying text (discussing the
difference between presumptive and specific issue sections and the appropriate
treatment for Sections 150 and 153).
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-49, 151-52,
154-55, 189-97 (1971).
48. See id. § 146.
49. See id. § 192.
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from the territorial rules toward a more policy-based alternative.50
Shifting from the First Restatement’s treatment of the territorial-
based presumptive sections as conclusive, the Second Restatement
applies territorial-based presumptions merely as rebuttable pre-
sumptions.  This is evidenced by the overriding mandate of the
Second Restatement that directs courts to apply the territorial pre-
sumption unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state possesses a more significant relationship to the parties and the
tortious occurrence or contractual relationship involved in the dis-
pute.51  Courts are thus instructed to engage in their analysis, not
with respect to the case as a whole, but instead, with respect to
each disputed issue arising in the case.52  Consequently, for a given
issue, the laws of a jurisdiction implicated by the applicable pre-
sumptive section may be trumped by the laws of a jurisdiction de-
termined by the court as possessing a more significant relationship
to the parties and the tortious occurrence or contractual relation-
ship involved in the dispute.
However, the relevant question then becomes: How is a court
to determine which state has the most significant relationship to
the parties and the tortious occurrence or contractual relationship?
This question is answered, albeit ambiguously, by the next two
tiers of the Second Restatement.  Each of the tiers provides courts
with a list of factors to be taken into account when attempting to
determine the jurisdiction possessing the most significant relation-
ship with the parties and the tortious occurrence or contractual
relationship involved in the dispute.
2.   The Second and Third Tiers: Finding the Jurisdiction with
the Most Significant Relationship Via the Application of Section 6
50. See generally Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REV. 315 (1972); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS,
INTRODUCTION at VII-IX (1971).
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 146-49, 151-52,
154-55, 189-97 (1971).
52. This technique is endorsed by the presumptive sections as well as by the
language of the general area of law sections, Sections 145 and 188, which call for
the law to be applied to an “issue.”  Id. §§ 145(2), 146-49, 151-52, 154-55, 188(2),
189-97.  In addition, the commentary to the Second Restatement states that
[t]he courts have long recognized that they are not bound to decide all
issues under the local law of a single state . . . .  Each issue is to receive
separate consideration if it is one which would be resolved differently
under the local law rule of two or more of the potentially interested
states.
Id. §§ 145 cmt. d, 188 cmt. d; see also NL Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 65
F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasizing the need for separate choice of law analyses
for each disputed issue).
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and the General Area-of-Law Sections.  In identifying the
jurisdiction that possesses the most significant relationship to a
legal issue, the parties and the disputed tortious occurrence or
contractual relationship, courts are directed to base their analysis
on the principles stated in Section 6 of the Second Restatement.53
Section 6 functions as a second tier of analysis and states, in
pertinent part:
When there is no [statutory] directive, the factors relevant to the
choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a)  the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b)  the relevant policies of the forum,
(c)  the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of
the particular issue,
(d)  the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law,
(f)  certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g)  ease in determination and application of the law to be
applied.54
The precise weight placed on each of these factors will depend
upon the particular type of issue involved, as well as the unique
facts of the case.  For example, comments to the Second Restate-
ment suggest that, while the protection of justified expectations in-
corporated under factor (d) may be a major element to consider in
contract cases, it often will play an unimportant role in tort cases.55
Sections 145 and 188 together operate as a third tier to the
Second Restatement.  These two sections operate as the “general
area-of-law” sections for tort and contract, respectively.  Both,
however, add a fair amount of confusion to the field, since they de-
scribe an additional set of factors that courts apparently must con-
sider when applying the factors listed in Section 6.  For example,
when making a Section 6 analysis in tort, Section 145 directs courts
to consider, according to their relative importance with respect to
the particular issue:
(a)  the place where the injury occurred,
(b)  the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
53. The general area of law and presumptive sections of the Second Restate-
ment, Sections 145-49, 151-52, 154-55 and 188-97, all refer courts back to the Sec-
tion 6 factors in order to conduct a “most significant relationship” analysis.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145-49, 151-52, 154-55, 188-97
(1971).
54. Id. § 6(2).
55. See id. §§ 145 cmt. b; 188 cmt. b.
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(c)  the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d)  the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties
is centered.56
The concept is similar for choice of law determinations in contract.
Section 187 provides that in most cases, the law contractually se-
lected by the parties will be upheld.57  However, in cases where the
parties fail to make such a determination, Section 188 directs
courts to consider, as part of their Section 6 analyses, the following
factors, listed in accordance with their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue:
(a)  the place of contracting,
(b)  the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c)  the place of performance,
(d)  the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e)  the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties.58
In conducting their analyses, courts are directed to keep in mind
that if the place of negotiating the contract and the place of per-
formance are in the same state, the law of that state “will usually
be applied” except as otherwise provided by the presumptive sec-
tions.59
C. The Second Restatement as a Continued Source of Confusion
1.  Difficulty in Conducting a Valid Analysis.  In providing
courts with three different levels of factors to consider when
analyzing choice of law issues, the Second Restatement has freed
courts from the analytical constraints of the First Restatement’s
inflexible rules.  At the same time, with three different sets of
interrelated factors to consider and no meaningful way to balance
these factors, it is easy to see how the Second Restatement has led
to a substantial amount of confusion among courts and scholars.
Take, for example, a simple personal injury claim resulting from an
auto accident.  Under the First Restatement, the choice of law
issue was straightforward: choice of law issues concerning personal
56. Id. § 145(2).
57. Id. § 187.
58. Id. § 188(2)(a)-(e); see also id. § 186 (“Issues in contract are determined
by the law chosen by the parties in accordance with the rule of § 187 and other-
wise by the law selected in accordance with the rule of § 188.”).
59. Id. § 188(3).
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injury were governed by the law of the place where the wrong
occurred.60
Under the Second Restatement, however, the analysis be-
comes much more complex, as courts are forced to jump through
several intellectual hoops.  First, the court must begin its analysis
with the applicable presumptive section, in this case Section 146,
which establishes a presumption in favor of the law of the place of
the injury.61  Second, to determine if the presumption established
in Section 146 should be overturned, the court must carry forward
this presumption to Section 6 where it must analyze the following:
(a)  the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b)  the relevant policies of the forum,
(c)  the relevant policies of other interested states and the rela-
tive interests of those states in the determination of the particu-
lar issue,
(d)  the protection of justified expectations,
(e)  the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f)  the certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g)  the ease in the determination and application of the law to
be applied.62
Finally, the court must decide what to do with the general area of
law section, in this case Section 145, and its additional list of fac-
tors to be taken into consideration when applying Section 6:
(a)  the place where the injury occurred,
(b)  the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c)  the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties, and
(d)  the place where the relationship between the parties is cen-
tered.63
At this point, it is important to note that neither Section 146
nor Section 6 directly refers courts to Section 145.  Instead, Section
146 guides the court directly to Section 6.64  As a result, the court
must render a decision as to how it wishes to treat those factors
listed in Section 145.65  There appear to be two possibilities as to
how the court may proceed.  First, the court may read into the pre-
sumptive section an implied directive to consider the factors listed
60. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378 (1934); supra note 6.
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971).
62. Id. § 6(2)(a)-(g).
63. Id. § 145(2)(a)-(d).
64. See id. § 145.
65. This same issue arises in contract, where neither the presumptive sections
nor Section 6 refer the court to the factors listed in Section 188.
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in the general area-of-law sections en route to a Section 6 analysis.
Under this approach, courts will often be required to balance the
factors contained in all three tiers whenever it conducts a choice of
law analysis.  Alternatively, the court may choose to incorporate
the general area-of-law factors into its analysis only in those in-
stances where there are no applicable presumptive sections.  In the
end, regardless of its decision, the court will be faced with an
overwhelming number of factors to consider with little guidance as
to how to interpret their significance.66
To provide a more concrete example, suppose a personal in-
jury claim arose out of an auto accident occurring in state A, the
forum, and is between plaintiff, who resides in state B, and defen-
dant, who resides in state C.  Assume that the laws of state A and
B allow plaintiff to recover, while the law of state C allows no re-
covery.  Under the Second Restatement, the court is asked to lo-
cate and apply the law of the jurisdiction that possesses the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.67  How-
ever, the court is faced with contacts that implicate the laws of
three different jurisdictions.  The application of the law of state A
is supported by (i) the initial presumption established in Section
146,68 (ii) any policies of the forum state A,69 and (iii) the Section
145 factors implicating the law of state A as both the place of in-
jury and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred.70
In favor of the law of state B, however, are (i) any policies of
state B,71 and (ii) the Section 145 factor implicating the law of state
B as the plaintiff’s place of residence.72
Finally, the application of the law of state C is supported by (i)
any policies of state C,73 and (ii) the Section 145 factor implicating
the law of state C as defendant’s place of residence.74
In such cases, how is a court to proceed?  The law of state A
enjoys the most support in terms of having the greatest number of
contacts with the dispute.  However, such a “contact counting” ap-
proach is unsatisfactory and, in any event, appears to have been
66. See William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L.
REV. 1371, 1388 (1997) (observing that “the Second Restatement provides judges
with a starting point: a set of presumptions and a list of concerns worth address-
ing,” and noting that “[i]t is then up to the judge to make it all work”).
67. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(1) (1971).
68. See id. § 146.
69. See id. § 6(2)(b), (c).
70. See id. § 145(a), (b).
71. See id. § 6(2)(b), (c).
72. See id. § 145(c).
73. See id. § 6(2)(b), (c).
74. See id. § 145(c).
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rejected by the ALI’s use of the most significant relationship test, a
test that requires an analysis of both the quality and quantity of the
contacts connecting the jurisdiction to the parties and the disputed
issue.  Sections 145 and 188 expressly state that their factors should
be “evaluated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular issue.”75 This rejects a “contact counting” meth-
odology that merely counts the number of contacts that each juris-
diction possesses with the parties and disputed issue without ana-
lyzing the quality of those contacts.  In addition, the comments to
the Second Restatement suggest that the contacts between a state
and a disputed issue will possess differing weights depending upon
the type of issue involved.76
Beyond this shallow guidance rejecting one possible approach,
the Second Restatement fails to provide courts with meaningful di-
rection.  Instead, as seen in the above example, the Second Re-
statement provides criteria under which reasonable arguments can
be made for the application of the laws of any of the involved
states, while leaving courts with little guidance as to the proper
method of balancing among these criteria.77
75. Id. §§ 145(2), 188(2).
76. See id. §§ 145 cmt. b, 188 cmt. b (declaring that the Section 6(2)(d) factor
in favor of protecting the justified expectations of parties will carry more weight
in contractual issues than in those involving tort).  Accordingly, a number of cases
expressly have denounced “contact counting” approaches.  See, e.g., Bates v. Su-
perior Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1372 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (determining that the
appropriate analysis is “qualitative not quantitative”); Mezroub v. Capella, 702
So.2d 562, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (stating that the most significant rela-
tionship test “is not a simple ‘center of gravity’ or ‘contacts counting’ test,” and
holding that “the court must determine which state or states have a true interest
in the application of their law, by examining the various factual contacts in light of
the rather malleable principles set forth in Section 6”); Kammerer v. Western
Gear Corp., 618 P.2d 1330, 1336 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (declaring that “[w]hile
particular contacts, such as the place of injury, are to be considered . . . the court
is not simply to count contacts, but must consider the competing policies and in-
terests of the two states with respect to application of their laws”).
77. As the distinguished Professor Currie expressed in quoting Justice
Traynor’s complaint about the weight properly accorded to a presumption, “Can
you weigh a bushel of horsefeathers against next Thursday?”  Currie, supra note
43, at 754 (quoting Justice Traynor).  Many other commentators have expressed
their frustration with the Second Restatement’s theoretical inconsistencies.  See,
e.g., David F. Cavers, Re-restating the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Contracts,
in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349 (Kurt H. Nadelmann
et al., eds., 1961); Patrick J. Borchers, Courts and the Second Conflicts Restate-
ment: Some Observations and an Empirical Note, 56 MD. L. REV. 1232, 1240
(1997) (noting the “schizophrenic” nature of the Second Restatement);
Ehrenzweig, supra note 41, at 1231-36 (“[M]any new specific provisions [of the
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One novel, but sensible, approach that Alaska courts may
consider is to adopt a choice of law methodology that groups to-
gether states possessing similar laws when resolving disputes in-
volving three or more jurisdictions.  Using the above auto accident
hypothetical, courts using this grouping method initially would
note that the laws of states A and B are the same with respect to
the disputed issue in that they both allow plaintiff to recover.  In
the choice of law analysis, the court would then group together the
factors in favor of applying law A and B.  The court’s analysis
would then pit all the factors in favor of applying the laws of either
state A or B against all of the factors in favor of applying the law
of state C.
This sort of analysis would have a definite impact in three-way
cases where the law of the jurisdiction with the unique law has the
most significant relation to the occurrence and the parties when
considered against the two other states individually, but not when
considered against the two states collectively.  For example, in the
hypothetical above, if state C is forty percent related to the occur-
rence and the parties, while states A and B are each only thirty
percent related to the occurrence and the parties, then the law of
state C could be applied as it is the jurisdiction possessing the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties.  Looking
past the political boundaries, however, and instead to the conflict-
ing laws at issue, it becomes clear that the laws of state A or B
should be applied as their pro-plaintiff law is sixty percent related
to the occurrence and the parties compared to state C’s pro-
defendant law that is only forty percent related.
Although the Second Restatement is phrased in terms calling
for the law of the state having the most significant relation,78 courts
at least should question the intelligence of strictly basing their de-
cisions on this language, as the field is known as choice of law, not
choice of states.  In the end, courts that approach choice of law is-
sues as a winner-take-all battle among sovereign states attempting
to have their individual law applied to disputes in which they have
                                                                                                                                
Second Restatement] will inevitably add to the confusion created by the original
version.”); Smith, supra note 11, at 1170 (“The Restatement is a curious montage
of virtually every choice of law theory imaginable, all brought together in one,
almost undecipherable text.”).
The court’s dilemma is made only worse when the law of all three involved
states differ – take, for example, a tort case in which plaintiff’s home state allows
plaintiff an unlimited recovery, defendant’s home state precludes plaintiff’s re-
covery, and the law of the state where the tort is committed allows plaintiff a lim-
ited recovery (e.g., no punitive damages).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 145(1), 188(1)
(1971).
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an interest may well reject this grouping method.  However, courts
that view choice of law disputes as calling for the application of the
law most connected to the parties and the occurrence or transac-
tion should be more eager to adopt such a grouping method.
2.   Risk of Circumscribing Meaningful Judicial Review.
Because conflict of law cases applying the Second Restatement
contain so many factors and minimal direction on how to weigh
these factors, courts are able to “work backwards” in their
decisions without being detected.  That is, courts may take
advantage of the Second Restatement’s ambiguity by first selecting
the outcome of the case that “feels” correct to the court (without
engaging in any genuine choice-of-law analysis), and then
attempting to justify its selected result by pointing to a set of
contacts connected to the desired jurisdiction and labeling them as
“the most significant.”79  In this manner, the ambiguity of the
Second Restatement’s provisions provides courts with an ability to
circumscribe meaningful judicial review without facing
repercussions. As a result, the ambiguity of the Second
Restatement not only prevents courts from making a good faith
effort to apply its provisions, but also tosses a shroud over the
judicial decision-making process in a manner that makes it difficult
both to hold courts accountable for their decisions and to rely on
their decisions as meaningful precedent.
D. Alaska’s Special Concerns
Given the vast ambiguity and uncertainty of the Second Re-
statement, Alaska courts must develop their own methods of in-
terpreting and weighing the various factors of the Second Re-
statement. This effort has been hampered by state and federal
79. See Borchers, supra note 77, at 1233 (suggesting that “citation to the Sec-
ond Restatement is often little more than a veil hiding judicial intuition”); Fisher
v. Huck, 624 P.2d 177, 178 (Or. Ct. App. 1981) (admitting that since the adoption
of the Second Restatement, “the choice of law has been based upon somewhat
amorphous considerations, the evaluation of which depends in large measure on
the semantics used by the court making the particular decision”); Willis L.M.
Reese, Conflict of Laws, 33 AM. J. COMP. L. 332, 334-37 (1985) (book review)
(observing that the judicial practice of working backwards in choice of law deci-
sions is considered a “common phenomenon”); Reppy, supra note 39, at 652
(criticizing the “better law method” in which the judge decides the result in ad-
vance and then simply instructs a law clerk to “[w]rite an opinion under which
plaintiff prevails, and employ all methods that support the result”); Stewart E.
Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory,  142 U. PA. L. REV. 949,
974 (1994) (declaring that “a court can reach virtually any result in any choice of
law case and find some support for the result in the Second Restatement”).
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courts applying Alaska law and interpreting the Second Restate-
ment in an inconsistent and illogical manner.  Part of this dilemma
stems from decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court itself.  Al-
though the court has issued only a few opinions directly interpret-
ing the Second Restatement, these opinions have misapplied the
treatise’s complex three-tiered system.80  Adding to the confusion
are two federal district court cases that have misinterpreted and
misapplied Alaska’s choice of law methodology.81  Thus, before
Alaska courts can hope to tackle the complex balancing called for
by the three-tiered structure of the Second Restatement, they must
first unravel these decisions to begin to understand how each of
the three separate tiers of the Second Restatement were meant to
be applied.
1.   Alaska Supreme Court Cases.  One of the major
determinations to be decided by the Alaska Supreme Court
involves how it will incorporate the general area of law sections for
tort and contract, Sections 145 and 188 respectively, into its choice
of law analysis.  Thus far, the Alaska Supreme Court has allowed
these general area of law sections to disrupt its application of the
Second Restatement. In Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Company
of Canada,82 the Alaska Supreme Court was asked to determine
the appropriate measure of damages to be applied in a wrongful
death case brought by a pilot’s widow against the owner and
manufacturer of an aircraft.83  Under the law of Alaska – where the
crash occurred, the owner of the aircraft was domiciled and
conducting business, and the decedent pilot lived for the majority
of three years prior to his death84 – pre-judgment interest is
awarded as part of a compensatory damages award.  Neither
income taxes nor inflation are considered in awarding future lost
wages, awards for future lost wages are not reduced to present
value, and widows and children are not allowed to recover for their
own mental anguish resulting from the decedent’s death.85  Under
the law of Florida, however – where the decedent pilot’s personal
representative and family resided86 – successful plaintiffs are not
entitled to recover pre-judgment interest, income tax is deducted
80. See Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. Arco Chem. Co., 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995);
Ehredt v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).
81. See Carriere v. Cominco Alaska, Inc., 823 F. Supp. 680 (D. Alaska 1993);
Robinson v. U-Haul Co., 785 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Alaska 1992).
82. 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985).
83. See id. at 449.
84. See id. at 453.
85. See id. at 452-53.
86. See id. at 453.
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from future wage awards, awards for future wages are reduced to
present value, the jury is allowed to consider the effect of inflation
in determining the amount of lost wages, and surviving spouses
and children may recover for their own mental pain and suffering
resulting from the decedent’s death.87
The Second Restatement suggests that the court should have
begun its analysis with Section 178, the presumptive section that
specifically applies to the amount of damages to be awarded in a
wrongful death claim.88  This section refers the court directly to
Section 175,89 where a presumption is established in favor of ap-
plying the law of the place of injury.90  The court should have then
carried this presumption forward to Section 6 to determine if its
factors displaced the Section 175 presumption.91  Finally, the court
then should have made a precedent-setting determination as to
how best to incorporate the set of factors listed in the general area
of law section, Section 145, into its choice of law methodology, ei-
ther incorporating them into the Section 6 analysis or deeming
them inapplicable in cases where an applicable presumptive sec-
tion exists.92
Instead of following this approach, the court began by citing
Sections 178 and 175 without ever referring to the entire point of
these sections – their presumption in favor of the law of Alaska as
the place of the injury.93  Then, instead of carrying this presump-
tion to Section 6, the court got lost in a Section 145 detour, where
it carefully matched the facts of the case to the four considerations
87. See id. at 452.
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 178 (1971).  Sec-
tions 175-80 apply as the presumptive sections for “wrongful death actions” (in
the same manner that Sections 146-49, 151-52 and 154-55 apply as the presump-
tive sections for “torts”).  See id. §§ 146-49, 151-52, 154-55, 175-180.
89. See id. § 178 (“The law selected by application of the rule of § 175 deter-
mines the measure of damages in an action for wrongful death.”).
90. See id. § 175.  Section 175 states:
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the in-
jury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless,
with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more signifi-
cant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be ap-
plied.
Id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at §§ 6, 145.
93. See Ehredt, 705 P.2d at 453 (citing Sections 175 and 178 for the proposi-
tion that “[t]he measure of damages used in an action for wrongful death should
be the law of the state with the most significant relationship to the occurrence and
the parties”).
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listed in Section 145.94  Based upon its Section 145 analysis, the
court held the law of Alaska applicable to the dispute,95 giving the
heart of the Second Restatement, Section 6, nothing more than a
token footnote reference.96  As a result, rather than basing its
analysis on the undeniably relevant sections of the Second Re-
statement, Sections 178, 175 and 6, the court instead sidestepped
these sections and based its holding upon Section 145.97
Ten years later, in Palmer G. Lewis Co. v. Arco Chemical
Co.,98 the Alaska Supreme Court again rested its analysis upon the
factors of a general area of law section, this time in contract and in
reliance upon the factors listed in Section 188.99  The court was
asked to rule on the enforceability of an indemnity provision con-
tained in a sales contract between a manufacturer and one of its
raw material suppliers.100  The manufacturer claimed that the law
of Washington should be applied because Washington was the site
of the negotiating, contracting and performance of the sales con-
tract.101  The supplier argued that because the ultimate issue con-
cerned whether the manufacturer was entitled to implied indem-
nity under Alaska’s common law, the law of Alaska should be
applied.102  While there is no doubt that the court’s Section 188
analysis was well-founded, as there was neither a choice of law
clause in the contract nor an applicable presumptive section,103 the
court rested its holding in favor of the law of Washington prema-
turely on the Section 188 factors without even referencing Section
6.104
At this point it must be emphasized that, regardless of
whether the Alaska Supreme Court reached the same results that
would have been achieved through proper applications of the Sec-
ond Restatement, the court’s misinterpretations and misapplica-
tions in the two above cases establish questionable precedent for
future decisions and generate confusion among lower courts and
practitioners about how the sections of the Second Restatement
are meant to be applied.  To avoid such confusion and to develop a
more coherent and analytically consistent method of applying the
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 453 n.9.
97. See id.
98. 904 P.2d 1221 (Alaska 1995).
99. See id. at 1227.
100. See id. at 1223.
101. See id. at 1227.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
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Second Restatement in the future, Alaska courts must understand
how to administer properly the three-tiered structure of the Sec-
ond Restatement.
a.  Mistake 1: The Failure To Use the Presumptive Sections
and Section 6.  One of the few things that is made clear by the Sec-
ond Restatement is that the presumptive sections and Section 6 are
both vital aspects of a choice of law analysis.  However, as a result
of the two aforementioned Alaska Supreme Court cases, Alaska
practitioners and lower courts may be left confused as to the role
of these important sections.  In order to interpret the Second Re-
statement more accurately, courts should consider two important
points.  First, there can be no doubt that the Second Restatement
contains presumptive sections for a reason.  If the presumptions
contained in them are displaced by later analyses under Section 6,
courts should not omit this important information from its opin-
ions, but instead should go through the analytical motions so as to
make the omission clear.105  Second, courts must realize that the
general factors listed in Sections 145 and 188 are directed to be
used “in applying the principles of § 6.”106  That is, courts must con-
duct a Section 6 analysis regardless of whether they begin with a
presumptive section or a general area of law section.  It is simply
improper for courts to engage solely in a Section 145 or Section
188 analysis, as the factors listed in these sections are interdepend-
ent with those listed in Section 6.
b.  Mistake 2: The Proper Role of The General Area of Law
Sections: Sections 145 and 188.  Given the focus that the DeHavil-
land court placed on Section 145, it appears that the Alaska Su-
preme Court will incorrectly use the factors listed in general area
of law Sections 145 and 188 even when one of the presumptive sec-
tions applies.  While the Second Restatement does not give any
explicit guidance concerning the propriety of utilizing the general
area-of-law sections when one of the presumptive sections also ap-
plies, such a practice seems inconsistent with the language em-
105. Other courts similarly have failed to apply an applicable presumptive sec-
tion.  See, e.g., Johnson v. Spider Staging Corp., 555 P.2d 997, 1000-02 (Wash.
1976) (overlooking Section 175 in a wrongful death case and instead applying
Sections 145 and 6); Mitchell v. United Asbestos Corp., 426 N.E.2d 350, 355 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1981) (ignoring Section 175 in wrongful death case and relying on Sec-
tions 145 and 6).
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145(2), 188(2) (1971)
(emphasis added).
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bodied in the Second Restatement’s provisions and comments for
three reasons.107
First, the commentaries to Sections 145 and 188 strongly sug-
gest that the presumptive sections were intended to replace rather
than complement an analysis of the factors listed in Sections 145
and 188.108  For example, the commentary to Section 145 states that
“[t]he rule of this Section states a principle applicable to all torts
and to all issues in tort and, as a result, is cast in terms of great
generality . . . .  [The following presumptive sections deal] with
particular torts as to which it is possible to state rules of greater
precision.”109  The commentary to Section 186 similarly provides
that “Sections 187-188 set forth general rules for determining the
state of the applicable law.  The following presumptive sections de-
scribe various types of contracts for which it is possible, on the ba-
sis of existing knowledge, to lay down more precise rules for de-
termining the state of the applicable law.”110  The language of these
comments suggests that the presumptive sections were promul-
gated for specific types of torts and contracts for which more pre-
107. Courts across the country have struggled with this concept.  Unsure about
how to proceed, most courts have preferred to err on the side of being over-
rather than under-inclusive, and accordingly have analyzed all three of the Sec-
ond Restatement’s tiers.  See, e.g., Collins v. Trius, Inc., 663 A.2d 570, 572-73 (Me.
1995) (citing Sections 6, 145, and 146 before holding the Canadian law of damages
to apply to claims arising from an auto accident occurring in Maine in which all
parties were Canadian domiciliaries); Cosme v. Whitin Mach. Works, Inc., 632
N.E.2d 832, 834-836 (Mass. 1994) (citing Sections 146, 145 and 6 before deter-
mining that Massachusetts law applies); Gilbert Spruance Co. v. Pennsylvania
Mfrs. Assoc. Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 885, 888-89 (N.J. 1993) (describing Section 193 as
providing guidance on how to apply the Section 188 factors); Bates v. Superior
Court, 749 P.2d 1367, 1369-72 (Ariz. 1988) (en banc) (utilizing Sections 146, 145
and 6 before determining that the Section 146 presumption applied).
However, a few recent courts have obtained a better understanding of the
Second Restatement’s three tiered system and have realized that the presumptive
sections replace, rather than complement, the general area of law sections.  See,
e.g., General Ceramics Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos., 66 F.3d 647, 655-59 (3d
Cir. 1995) (applying New Jersey’s choice of law principles as “embraced by . . .
Gilbert Spruance,” but differing its approach by proceeding directly from Section
193 to a Section 6 analysis without stopping en route to cite the Section 188 fac-
tors); Value House, Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 917 F. Supp. 5, 6-7 (D.D.C.
1996) (holding that Section 148, the presumptive section for fraud and tortious
misrepresentation, applies to a claim of negligent misrepresentation “rather than
Section 145” (emphasis added)).
108. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 145 cmt. a, 188
cmt. a (1971).
109. Id. § 145 cmt. a.
110. Id. § 186 cmt. a.
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cise applications of the Section 145 or 188 factors could be made.
Consequently, it would be erroneous for courts to reinvent the
wheel and potentially disrupt the “precise” determinations already
made by the ALI.
Second, the plain language of the presumptive sections di-
rectly refers the reader to the factors of Section 6 without provid-
ing any reference to the factors considered in Sections 145 or 188.111
In this respect, it is important for courts to understand the subtle
distinction between the true “presumptive” sections contained in
Title B of the chapters on tort112 and contract,113 and the “specific
issue” sections contained in Title C.114
The true presumptive sections operate as particular applica-
tions of the Section 145 or 188 factors for specific categories of
torts and contracts.115  Because these presumptive sections have al-
ready taken the factors listed in Sections 145 or 188 into account in
creating their presumptions, the Second Restatement directs
courts to advance directly to Section 6.116
In contrast to the true presumptive sections are the specific-
issue sections.  These sections are contained in a separate title of
the Second Restatement and apply to certain issues that arise in
tort or contract.117  For example, they apply to the standard of care
in torts,118 or the capacity to enter into a contract,119 rather than to
specific types of torts or contracts.  Instead of directing courts to
Section 6, these sections expressly refer the courts back to the fac-
tors listed in Sections 145 and 188.120  Confusion arises because
many of the specific-issue sections advise courts about how the
consideration of Section 145 or 188 factors often will affect the
111. Id. § 175.
112. See id. §§ 146-49, 151-52, 154-55 (labeled “Particular Torts”).
113. See id. §§ 189-97 (labeled “Particular Contracts”).
114. See id. §§ 156-74 (labeled “Important Issues”), 198-207 (labeled
“Particular Issues”).
115. See, e.g., id.
116. See, e.g., id. §§ 146 (applying to personal injury cases), 196 (applying to
contracts for the rendition of services).  Both sections refer to Section 6 and omit
any reference to the general area of law sections.
117. See id. tit. C, Introductory Note at 477.
118. See id. § 157.
119. See id. § 198.
120. See id. §§ 156-74, 198-205, 207.  The one exception is Section 206, which
definitively states that details of performance are determined by the law of the
place of performance.  See id. § 206.
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court’s ultimate determination.121  The suggestive language con-
tained in these specific issue sections, however, stops well short of
constituting a true presumption of the types contained in the pre-
sumptive sections.  Compare the direct operative language of Sec-
tion 146, the presumptive section for personal injury issues stating
that “the local law of the state where the injury occurred deter-
mines the rights and liabilities of the parties,”122 with the more
precatory language of Section 164, a specific issue section stating
that, when dealing with contributory fault issues, “the applicable
law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury oc-
curred.”123  As a result of this difference in language, courts should
view the guidance of the specific issue sections as providing noth-
ing more than added information as to how Section 145 and 188
factors “usually” affect the analysis.124  In the end, the important
distinction is that the presumptive sections, having already taken
the factors listed in the general area of law sections into account,
direct the courts to advance to Section 6 without stopping en route
to reconsider the Section 145 or 188 factors.  In contrast, the spe-
cific-issue sections have not pre-balanced the factors listed in Sec-
tions 145 or 188, and as a result, direct courts to consider the Sec-
tion 145 or 188 factors before conducting a Section 6 analysis.
Third, the specific presumptive section pertaining to fraud and
tortious misrepresentation, Section 148, suggests that courts are
expected to move directly from a presumptive section to a Section
6 analysis, rather than stopping en route for an analysis of the fac-
tors listed in Sections 145 or 188.125  Specifically, Section 148(2)
provides its own lengthy list of contacts to consider, many of which
relate to or are even repetitive of the general factors listed in Sec-
tion 145:
(a)  the place, or places, where the plaintiff acted in reliance
upon the defendant’s representations,
(b)  the place where the plaintiff received the representations,
(c)  the place where the defendant made the representations,
(d)  the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties,
121. See id. § 156(2) (“The applicable law will usually be the local law of the
state where the injury occurred.”); see also id. §§ 157(2), 158(2), 159(2), 160(2),
162(2), 164(2), 165(2), 166(2), 169(2), 172(2), 198(2), 199(2), 202(2).
122. See id. § 146 (emphasis added).
123. See id. § 164(2) (emphasis added).
124. The same “advisory” interpretation should be given to Sections 150, 153
and 188(3), as they comment on the “usual” results of a Section 6 analysis.  See id.
§§ 150(2) and (3), 153, 188(3).
125. See id. § 148.
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(e)  the place where a tangible thing which is the subject of the
transaction between the parties was situated at the time, and
(f)  the place where the plaintiff is to render performance under
a contract which he has been induced to enter by the false repre-
sentations of the defendant.126
Close analysis shows that this list largely is based upon the fac-
tors listed in Section 145; indeed, one factor is an exact replica of a
Section 145 factor.  Specifically, Section 148 factors (a) through (c)
are clearly related to Section 145’s focus on the location where the
injury occurred,127 and where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred,128 while Section 148 factor (d) is a verbatim replica of the
factor listed in Section 145(2)(c).129  The only reasonable explana-
tion for such replication is that the drafters intended for courts to
advance directly from the presumptive section to a Section 6
analysis without detouring to the general area of law sections for a
repetitive review.
c.  A New Strategy for Alaska Courts.  Because the most sen-
sible reading of the Second Restatement utilizes the factors listed
in the presumptive sections and Section 6, and treats the presump-
tive sections as particularized applications of the general factors
listed in Sections 145 and 188, Alaska courts should establish a new
overall strategy for analyzing choice of law issues.  Under its new
strategy, Alaska’s choice of law approach under the Second Re-
statement should be broken down into two distinct analyses.  The
determining factor as to which analysis to apply would depend on
whether or not a presumptive section is triggered by the specific
facts set forth before the court.  If one of the presumptive sections
applies, the court should begin with the applicable presumptive
section and then move to a Section 6 analysis to determine
whether that presumption is displaced, without stopping en route
to re-analyze the factors listed in Sections 145 and 188.  However,
if the particular set of facts before the court does not trigger the
application of any presumptive section, the court should consider
the factors listed in the applicable general area of law section
(Section 145 if in tort, or Section 188 if in contract) in conducting
its Section 6 analysis.
2.   Confused Federal District Court Opinions.  The above
decisions of the Alaska Supreme Court are not the only cases
clouding the choice of law field for Alaska practitioners and lower
126. Id. § 148(2).
127. See id. § 145(2)(a).
128. See id. § 145(2)(b).
129. See id. § 145(2)(c).
MESCHEWSKI.CONVERT.2 05/07/99  11:37 AM
28 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [16:1
courts.  Adding to the confusion have been district court opinions
from within the Ninth Circuit attempting to apply Alaskan choice
of law methodologies.  In these opinions, the federal court makes
its own determinations as to how Alaska courts would decide
certain issues.  Many of these determinations, however, are
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter, of the Second Restatement.
As a result, Alaska courts should consider these federal decisions
carefully before deferring to their statements as to what they have
deemed to be the status of Alaskan choice of law.
a.  Robinson v. U-Haul Company.  In Robinson v. U-Haul
Co.,130 the district court was faced with a choice of law issue in-
volving contacts with four different states.131  The court character-
ized the plaintiffs as former Florida domiciliaries on their way to
their future domicile in Alaska.132  The defendant, a Florida com-
pany, had rented plaintiffs a tow dolly for their journey.133  During
their trip, plaintiffs were involved in an accident in the Yukon Ter-
ritory of Canada.134  Plaintiffs alleged that the accident, and the
personal injuries for which they sought damages, directly resulted
from the failure of their tow dolly, which was manufactured in
Iowa.135  Defendant requested that the court apply Alaska law,
which had abolished joint and several liability, while plaintiffs filed
an opposition requesting the court to apply Florida law, which con-
tinued to recognize joint and several liability.136
130. 785 F. Supp. 1378 (D. Alaska 1992).
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1379.  This legal conclusion is questionable given the guidance of
the Second Restatement, which declares that “a domicil once established contin-
ues until it is superseded by a new domicil.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 (1971).  Furthermore, in the illustrations to Section 19,
the specific example is given in which: “A, having a domicil in state X, decides to
make his home in state Y.  He leaves X and is on his way to Y but has not yet
reached Y.  His domicil is X.”  Id. § 19 illus. 4.  As a result, even though the plain-
tiffs in Robinson were in transit, they clearly would have been considered domi-
ciliaries of Florida under the Second Restatement at the time the cause of action
arose.  Plaintiffs, however, may have been considered Alaska domiciliaries at the
time the issue was adjudicated.  Whether the court should look to the facts at the
time the cause of action arose, or instead, at the time the issue is adjudicated, is
discussed in the section of this Article on “freezing.”  See infra, notes 159-64 and
accompanying text.
133. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
134. See id. at 1378.
135. See id. at 1378-79.
136. See id. at 1378.
MESCHEWSKI.CONVERT.2 05/07/99  11:37 AM
1999] CHOICE OF LAW 29
Purporting to apply Alaska’s choice of law methodology,137 the
district court determined that the laws of Alaska were applicable
to the joint and several liability issue.138  Of importance to Alaskan
courts and practitioners, however, is not the outcome, but rather
the fact that the district court committed a number of errors in
reaching its conclusion.
i. Erroneous Interpretation of a Forum-Law Bias.  The
Robinson court’s first error was its creation of a forum-law bias in
Alaska’s choice of law methodology that, until this point, had
never been associated with Alaska law.139  Specifically, the court
stated that “[w]hile it is true that the Alaska Supreme Court cites
the [Restatement Second] favorably, it seems clear that the Alaska
courts will apply the law of Alaska unless there is a substantial rea-
son to apply the law of another state.”140  What is clear, however, is
that Alaska opinions never have suggested such a forum-law bias.
In support of its interpretation of Alaska law, the district court
cited footnote nine of Ehredt v. DeHavilland Aircraft Co. of Can-
ada,141 a footnote that does nothing more than provide an exact
quotation of Section 6 of the Second Restatement, which notably
contains no such forum-law bias.142
One possible explanation for the Robinson court’s misinter-
pretation of Alaska law is that the court mistakenly believed that a
forum-law bias was called for by Section 6.  This explanation is
evidenced by the court’s statement during its Section 6 analysis
that “applying the law of the forum in all but the rare case will
serve the interest of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of re-
sult and will always provide ease in the determination and applica-
tion of the law to be applied.”143  This quotation is a clear reference
to Section 6(2) factors (f) and (g), which direct the court to factor
such considerations into its analysis.144  However, if the court relied
on this language of Section 6 to interpret a forum-law bias into the
Second Restatement, it clearly placed undue emphasis on subsec-
tions (f) and (g), as they are but two of seven different factors
listed in Section 6 that are meant to be balanced against the pre-
137. Federal district courts exercising jurisdiction based on diversity of citizen-
ship apply the choice of law rules of the state in which they sit.  See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941).
138. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. 705 P.2d 446 (Alaska 1985), cited in Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.
142. See DeHavilland, 705 P.2d at 453 n.9 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971)).
143. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(f)-(g) (1971).
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sumptions and factors listed in other sections of the Second Re-
statement.145  For example, as discussed above, Section 146 estab-
lishes a presumption in favor of applying the law of the place
where the injury occurred, regardless of whether that jurisdiction
happens to be the forum.146  Section 6(2)(c) expressly requires
courts to consider the relevant policies of involved non-forum
states and the relative interests of those states in the determination
of the particular issue.147  Reading a forum-law bias into the Second
Restatement that is rebutted only in the “rare case in which the
connection between Alaska and the parties is so remote that the
law of some other place must be applied in order to conform to the
reasonable expectations of the parties, or to avoid injustice,”148  as
the Robinson court has done, places undue emphasis on subsec-
tions (f) and (g) and effectively reads the Second Restatement’s
presumptions and other factors out of the treatise.
A second possible explanation for the district court’s errone-
ous interpretation is that it was based on a prior Ninth Circuit case,
Jenkins v. Whittaker Corporation.149  In that case, the court of ap-
peals interpreted a similar forum-law bias into the law of Hawaii.150
In Jenkins, however, the court of appeals took notice of a Hawaii
Supreme Court decision that was particularly conspicuous in the
sense that it went to extreme lengths to reject the guidance of the
Second Restatement and other modern choice of law theories in
order to apply Hawaiian law, rather than the law of the parties’
domicile, to an interspousal immunity issue.151  While the court of
appeals had adequate grounds for reading a forum-law bias into
145. See id. § 6(2)(a)-(g).  As the Supreme Court of California noted, “[e]ase of
determining applicable law and uniformity of rules of decision . . . must be subor-
dinated to the objective of proper choice of law in conflict cases, i.e., to determine
the law that most appropriately applies to the issue involved . . . .”  Reich v. Pur-
cell, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (Cal. 1967) (en banc) (citation omitted).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971) (“In an
action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the par-
ticular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the prin-
ciples stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law
of the other state will be applied.”).
147. See id. § 6(2)(c).
148. Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.
149. 785 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1986).
150. See id. at 724-25.
151. See id; see also Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586, 591-95 (Hawaii 1981); Smith,
supra note 11, at 1067 (noting that Peters specifically rejected the Second Re-
statement, as well as several other modern approaches, in reaching its conclu-
sion).
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this astonishing Hawaiian decision, no such justification is evi-
denced in Alaska case law.  Quite the opposite, Alaska’s commit-
ment to the Second Restatement, which contains no such forum
law favoritism, shows that it clearly is improper to transpose such a
reading into Alaska’s choice of law methodology.
ii.  Failure to Apply Section 171 or Section 145.  A sec-
ond mistake committed by Robinson involved failure on two
fronts.  First, it failed to apply specific issue Section 171,152 which
directs courts to Section 145 to determine the controlling law when
faced with joint and several liability issues in tort.153  Second, it
failed to proceed with a Section 145 analysis before applying the
factors listed in Section 6.154  However, rather than taking the Sec-
tion 145 factors “into account in applying the principles of § 6,”155
as directed by the Second Restatement, the court merely proffered
the conclusory statement: “Evaluating this case in light of the Re-
statement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145 and § 6 (1971), I
conclude that Alaska law rather than Florida law should govern.”156
Nowhere did the court elaborate on its supposed “evaluation” of
Section 145 or even refer to any of the factors listed in Section 145,
many, if not all, of which implicated jurisdictions other than
Alaska.157  However, instead of acknowledging these factors and
152. See supra notes 107-129 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
specific issue sections.  It should be noted that, although Section 171 is a specific
issue section, it is not one of the many specific issue sections that remark on how
an analysis of the general area of law section will “usually” end up.  Instead, it re-
fers the court directly to a Section 145 analysis without first attempting to predict
the end result of that analysis.
153. Section 171 states that “the law selected by application of the rule of § 145
determines the measure of damages.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 171 (1971).  Furthermore, comment e and illustration 1 to Section 171
both specifically state that choice of law issues concerning joint and several liabil-
ity are to be determined by the law of Section 145.  Id. § 171, cmt. e and illus. 1.
154. Although the plaintiffs’ ultimate claim was for personal injury (a Section
146 issue), the particular issue before the court involved joint and several liability.
Because courts are directed to analyze each choice of law issue individually, a
proper choice of law analysis in this case would have been conducted under Sec-
tion 171 rather than Section 146.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2) (1971).
156. Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.
157. For example, Section 145(2)(a) directs courts to the place where the injury
occurred (the Yukon Territory); Section 145(2)(b) implicates the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred (probably Iowa, where the tow dolly was
manufactured, or Florida, where it was supposed to be kept in proper operating
condition, but, in any event, not Alaska since the accident occurred prior to plain-
tiff’s arrival in Alaska).  Section 145(2)(c) refers to the domicile, residence and
place of business of the parties (in defendant’s case, Florida and in plaintiffs’ case,
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taking them into account during its Section 6 analysis, the court
neglected any meaningful discussion regarding the relevance of the
Section 145 factors, and proceeded to base its entire analysis on its
fabricated forum-law bias and its erroneous attempt to coordinate
the specific facts of the case with several of the factors listed in
Section 6.158
iii. The “Freezing” Issue: A Call for Guidance from
Alaska Courts.  A third point to emphasize is that the Robinson
court did not “freeze” the factual situation at the time the cause of
action arose.  In other words, the district court did not appear to
analyze the choice of law issue according to the facts that existed at
the time of the alleged commission of the tort, but instead seemed
to take into consideration facts that occurred after the alleged
commission of the tort.  This is evidenced by the court’s charac-
terization of the plaintiffs as former Florida domiciliaries159 and its
emphasis on the plaintiffs’ post-accident contacts with Alaska.160
While this approach was not necessarily erroneous, because the
district court was forced to make this decision without the benefit
of Alaskan precedent, Alaska courts should re-examine the issue.
The importance of “freezing” should not be underestimated.
For example, if the district court had frozen the parties in place at
the time of the alleged tort, the plaintiffs would have been treated
as Florida domiciliaries.161  In addition, the plaintiffs may not have
been considered Alaska residents for Section 145(2)(c) purposes,
since they had not yet reached their destination.  If this were the
case, other than being the forum state, Alaska would not have pos-
                                                                                                                                
arguably Florida as well – at least in terms of domicile).  Section 145(2)(d) refers
courts to the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered
(presumably Florida, as the place where the tow dolly was rented by defendant to
plaintiffs).
158. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379 (concocting a phantom forum-law bias
and generally referring to the language contained in Section 6(2) factors (b)
through (g)).
159. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379.  Under the Second Restatement,
plaintiffs were clearly Florida domiciliaries at the time the cause of action arose.
See supra note 132.  Plaintiffs could properly be considered former Florida domi-
ciliaries only when they had arrived, and acquired a new domicile, in Alaska.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 19 & illus. 4  (1971).  This did
not occur until after the cause of action arose.
160. See Robinson, 785 F. Supp. at 1379 (noting that plaintiffs had, since the
accident, become domiciled in Alaska and emphasizing, as part of the court’s Sec-
tion 6 analysis, plaintiffs’ post-accident connections with Alaska and the fact that
they had abandoned their Florida residence).
161. See supra note 132.
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sessed any contacts with the parties or disputed issue and its law
would likely not have been applied.162
While the Second Restatement fails to provide any guidance
on the “freezing” issue because of a lack of authority, Alaska may
wish to join the majority approach, which freezes the parties in
their respective positions at the time the cause of action arises so
that facts transpiring after the cause of action arises are not con-
sidered by the court in its choice of law analysis.163  The purpose
behind such a rule is, first, to prevent parties from taking deliber-
ate actions after a cause of action arises for the purposes of bet-
tering their chances in litigation, and, second, to allow parties to
take actions in good faith after the cause of action arises without
diminishing their chances of success in litigation that is based en-
tirely on past occurrences. 164  Finally, because the Robinson court
acted without relevant Alaska precedent, Alaska courts should re-
evaluate the freezing issue and make their own determination as to
its role in Alaska’s choice of law methodology.
b. Carriere v. Cominco Alaska, Inc.  Approximately one
year after Robinson, a district court sitting in Alaska was asked to
apply Alaska law to a choice of law issue involving the proper ap-
portionment of damages.  In Carriere v. Cominco Alaska, Inc.,165
the plaintiff, a Louisiana domiciliary, was injured while working in
Alaska when he was struck by a beam dropped from an overhead
crane.166  Plaintiff alleged that the accident was a result of the sup-
ply of faulty gas to the crane and brought negligence and strict li-
ability claims against the Alaska corporation that had supplied the
fuel.167  Defendant alleged that other parties (such as the original
supplier of the fuel, the fuel distributor, the quality control moni-
tor, the owner of the construction project and plaintiff’s own em-
162. In such a case, not only is it unlikely that Alaska law would possess the
“most significant relation” to the parties and to the disputed issue under the Sec-
ond Restatement, but in addition, the application of Alaska law would face seri-
ous constitutional impediments.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308-
13 (1981) (declaring that, if the forum state possesses only insignificant contacts to
the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of its law is unconstitu-
tional on either or both Due Process and Full Faith and Credit grounds).
163. See Gore v. Northeast Airlines, 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967); Rice v. Dow
Chem. Co., 875 P.2d 1213 (Wash. 1994) (en banc); Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727
(Cal. 1967).
164. See Patrick J. Borchers, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1992:
Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 143-144 (1994) (describing
the holding in Robinson as a “punishment for not forum shopping”).
165. 823 F. Supp. 680 (D. Alaska 1993).
166. See id. at 681.
167. See id.
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ployer) potentially were concurrent tortfeasors.  Defendant moved
for a ruling from the court that would allow the jury to allocate
fault among the concurrent tortfeasors or, in the alternative, for
leave to file a third-party complaint naming all the potentially con-
current tortfeasors as defendants.168  The court then engaged in a
choice of law analysis to determine whether it should apply the law
of Alaska or Louisiana, without ever discussing the content of
those laws or whether the laws even differed on the issue of liabil-
ity.169
As was the case in Robinson, the Carriere court failed to begin
with specific-issue Section 171, which directs courts to Section 145
to determine the controlling law when faced with issues involving
the apportionment of damages in tort.170  This time, however, the
court also erred by beginning with a Section 146 analysis,171 forget-
ting the important directive of the Second Restatement to conduct
a choice of law analysis for each individual disputed issue, not to
the case as a whole.172  Although the plaintiffs’ ultimate claim was
for personal injury (to which Section 146 is applicable), the par-
ticular claim before the court involved the apportionment of dam-
ages (which is a Section 171 issue).173  Because courts are directed
to analyze each choice of law issue individually, a proper choice of
law analysis in this case would not have involved Section 146, but
rather would have taken the following approach: First, begun with
Section 171; second, followed the directive of Section 171 to ana-
lyze the factors listed in Section 145; and, finally, considered the
factors of Section 145 as part of a Section 6 analysis.  Instead, the
court moved from its Section 146 analysis to an analysis of the Sec-
tion 145 factors in reaching its conclusion that Alaskan law would
apply to the issue174 (a movement that would have been correct had
the court begun with Section 171, but, as this Article has argued,
probably was incorrect under its own analysis that began with the
application of Section 146).175  However, it should be noted that,
although the district court ignored Section 171, erroneously began
with Section 146 and, for all intents and purposes, ignored those
168. See id. at 681-82.
169. See id. at 682-92.
170. See supra note 153.
171. See Carriere, 823 F. Supp. at 682.
172. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
173. See Carriere, 823 F. Supp. at 681.
174. See id. at 682.
175. See supra notes 106-29 and accompanying text Section IV(D)(1)(b), (c).
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factors listed in Section 6,176 Carriere was an improvement over
Robinson in the sense that the court seemed to abandon its earlier
interpretation of Alaska law that called for a phantom forum-law
bias.
In the end, Robinson and Carriere raise two major points.
First, Alaska courts should not allow a federal court’s erroneous
analyses and mistaken interpretations of Alaska law to dictate
Alaska’s approach toward choice of law issues.  Instead, Alaska
courts should scrutinize the federal court’s decisions and learn
from the errors made in their analyses in an attempt to develop
their own coherent body of law to govern the choice of law field.
Second, these federal cases highlight the fact that, until Alaska
courts better define their own choice of law approach, federal
courts are likely to continue to misinterpret Alaska law in future
adjudication.
V.  CONCLUSION
Although Alaska unquestionably has adopted the Second Re-
statement’s “most significant relationship” test for making choice
of law determinations, this adoption has not provided Alaska with
either a complete or coherent choice of law methodology.  Not
only is there a lack of an accepted norm for interpreting the com-
plex and ambiguous provisions of the Second Restatement, but,
both the Alaska Supreme Court and the United States District
Court for the district of Alaska have generated additional confu-
sion by handing down decisions that misinterpret the provisions of
the Second Restatement as well as misapply Alaska case law.  This
state of uncertainty in the field is misleading to courts and practi-
tioners who will need to understand in the future how the Second
Restatement is to be applied in Alaska.
To avoid further ambiguity and confusion, Alaska courts
should regroup and announce a new, more analytically sound
methodology for interpreting the Second Restatement.  While this
is easier said than done, Alaska courts should abandon their cur-
rent approach, in which the courts inconsistently apply the various
tiers of the Second Restatement, and adopt a new method that
employs one of two distinct analyses.  The particular type of analy-
sis used by the court in a given instance should depend on whether
one of the Second Restatement’s presumptive sections applies to
the specific set of facts before the court.  If a presumptive section is
triggered, the court should advance directly from the presumptive
176. The court cited Section 6 only in a footnote, in which it merely quoted the
factors listed in Section 6 without engaging in any discernable analysis.  See Carri-
ere, 823 F. Supp. at 682 n.1.
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section to a Section 6 analysis.  If a presumptive section is not trig-
gered, the court should interpret the Section 6 factors in light of
the considerations listed in the applicable general area of law sec-
tion.  Not only does such an approach provide Alaska courts with a
choice of law methodology that is analytically consistent with the
provisions and spirit of the Second Restatement, but it also pro-
vides future courts (state, as well as federal) and practitioners with
some sense of structural guidance as to how the complex provi-
sions of the Second Restatement are meant to be applied under
Alaska law.
Only after this fundamental revision can Alaska courts begin
to flesh out the best way to balance the various factors of the Sec-
ond Restatement, and move on to grapple with the more subtle is-
sues presented in this Article, such as the grouping approach and
the freezing concept, to determine their respective places in
Alaska’s overall choice of law methodology.
